Tensions in the periphery: Dependence and the trajectory of a low-cost productive model in the Central and Eastern European automotive industry by Adascalitei, D. & Guga, S.
This is a repository copy of Tensions in the periphery: Dependence and the trajectory of a 
low-cost productive model in the Central and Eastern European automotive industry.
White Rose Research Online URL for this paper:
http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/139351/
Version: Accepted Version
Article:
Adascalitei, D. and Guga, S. (2018) Tensions in the periphery: Dependence and the 
trajectory of a low-cost productive model in the Central and Eastern European automotive 
industry. European Urban and Regional Studies. ISSN 0969-7764 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0969776418795205
© The Author(s) 2018. This is an author produced version of a paper subsequently 
published in European Urban and Regional Studies. Uploaded in accordance with the 
publisher's self-archiving policy.
eprints@whiterose.ac.uk
https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/
Reuse 
Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless 
indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by 
national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of 
the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record 
for the item. 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 
emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. 
1 
 
Tensions in the Periphery: Dependence and the Trajectory of a Low-Cost Productive 
Model in the Central and Eastern European Automotive Industry 
 
This article analyzes the productive strategy adopted by Renault for its Dacia plant in Romania. 
It proposes a detailed analysis of the conditions for the success of the Logan project²5HQDXOW¶V
radical approach to the concept of the low-cost automobile. We look into both market- and 
production related aspects that have made the Logan work and highlight the tensions sparked 
E\5HQDXOW¶VGULYHWRFDSLWDOL]HRQLWVIDYRUDEOHPDUNHWVLWXDWLRQDVZHOODVWKHVXFFHVVDFKLHYHG
E\ 'DFLD¶V ZRUNHUV LQ GHIHQGLQJ WKHLU LQWHUHVWV ,Q SDUWLFXODU ZH HPSKDVL]H WKH FRPSDQ\
governance compromises that have shaped industrial relations at Dacia over the past decades 
and show how in recent years the maintaining of such a compromise has come increasingly in 
question due to threats with automation and relocation in a context of constantly rising wages 
and improving working conditions. Finally, we discuss the strategic dilemmas facing both 
management and labor, their possible resolutions, as well as the relevance of the Dacia case for 
understanding the future of Central and Eastern Europe as a peripheral region attracting 
automotive FDI. 
 
Introduction 
 
 
The automotive industry has been one of the vital components of the manufacturing complexes 
of Central and East European (CEE) countries both before and after the demise of state socialist 
regimes. During the first postsocialist decade, CEE states privatized most of their assets to 
IRUHLJQPXOWLQDWLRQDOVPDNLQJWKHDXWRPRWLYHLQGXVWU\DPDLQGULYHULQWKHUHJLRQ¶VVKLIWWRD
new form of dependent development (Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009; Pavlínek 2017). This paper 
seeks to contribute to the ongoing debate on the development of the CEE automotive industry 
and industrial relations (e.g., Jürgens, Ulrich and Martin Krzywdzinski 2009a, 2009b; Pavlínek 
2015, 2016, 2017; 3DYOtQHN'RPDĔVNLDQG*X]LN by shifting the focus of the debate to 
the diverse ways of matching FRPSDQLHV¶SURILWVWUDWHJLHV, sub-national labor markets and local 
compromises with organized labor. Empirically, we take the case of the Dacia±Renault factory 
in Romania and discuss the strategy employed by Renault for its Romanian investment, the 
DGDSWDWLRQRI5HQDXOW¶VH[LVWLQJSURGXFWLYHPRGHODFFRUGLQJ WR WKLV VWUDWHJ\ DVZHOODV WKH
implications of this productive model for the stability of enterprise-level industrial relations. 
While DDFLD¶V VXFFHVV DQG WUDMHFWRU\ KDV SOHQW\ WR GR ZLWK IDFWRUV XVXDOO\ KLJKOLJKWHG E\
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analyses looking at CEE cost-related competitive advantages and national-level institutional 
complementarities, we argue that automotive FDI in the region is in fact strategically much 
more diverse, with complex implications for the way we approach the question of the future of 
dependent development in the region.  
 
:HEHJLQE\HPEHGGLQJWKHVWRU\RI'DFLD¶VSULYDWL]DWLRQLQWRWKHODUJHU&((FRQWH[W$VXUYH\
of the literature on foreign direct investments (FDI) in the CEE automotive industry shows that 
WKHVH LQYHVWPHQWV LQLWLDOO\ IROORZHG D ³OHDVW-FRVW´ VWUDWHJ\ WKDW gradually shifted into a 
³complementary specialization´ strategy (Kurz and Wittke 1998), accompanied by an 
increasingly pronounced interest from components manufacturers to invest in the region. 
Complementary specialization entailed a deeper level of integration of CEE operations in 
Western European supply chains and markets. Even though maintaining low costs remained 
important, the East-West division of labor became increasingly complex, with Western 
multinationals devising long-term, capital-intensive investment strategies meant to profit from 
&((¶V full gamut of competitive advantages²not just cheap, but also skilled labor, and 
potentially large automobile markets. Product specialization is a core feature of complementary 
specialization (Jürgens and Krzywdzinski 2009a:30). WKLOHWDNLQJDGYDQWDJHRIWKHUHJLRQ¶V
low production costs, some automotive manufacturers like Renault or Volkswagen used CEE 
as a staging ground for developing low-cost models destined mainly for consumers in 
postsocialist countries, which eventually also proved appealing to Western consumers. In the 
case of Dacia, the Logan project took a more radical approach to the concept of low-cost 
production. The Logan was initially conceived as a car cheap enough to compete with older 
models produced in the region, yet with high enough quality to compare with Western 
standards. The project ended up being a remarkable business success. We analyze how this was 
SRVVLEOHDQGZKDW WXUQHG'DFLD LQWR5HQDXOW¶V³SURILWPDFKLQH´$XWRPRWLYH1HZV(XURpe 
2012). 
 
Using the theory of productive models developed by Boyer and Freyssenet (2000), we argue 
that the success of the Logan project was made possible by a profit strategy based on 
³LQQRYDWLRQDQGIOH[LELOLW\´WKDWZDVHPEHGGHGLQD³FRPSHWLWLYHDQGSrice export-RULHQWHG´
JURZWKPRGHWKDWSUHVHUYHG'DFLD¶VSURILWPDUJLQVHYHQGXULQJWKHILQDQFLDOFULVLVRI- 
2008. Required levels of flexibility were ensured through a combination of pay rises and 
improvements in working conditions. A governance compromise forged between the plant 
3 
 
trade union and management that exchanged wage increases for productivity seemed to offer 
the necessary stability in the relationship between the two actors. 
 
As we will show, however, this compromise proved to be a double-edged sword for both 
company and union and could not fully contain distributional conflicts at the plant. The 
compromise was forged at a time when Renault was facing financial difficulties that raised the 
importance of the Romanian factory in the group and subsequently increased the strategic 
power of the local union. While the union succeeded in obtaining higher wages, in the medium 
term it also altered the strategy used by management in attempting to contain future wage 
increases. In recent years, threats with relocation to lower wage countries and automation have 
become more frequent and, despite their questionable credibility, have not remained without 
FRQVHTXHQFHIRUWKHXQLRQ¶VQHJRWLDWLRQDSSURDFK$GLVFXVVLRQRIWKHVHVWUDWHJLFGLOHPPDV
suggests that instability generated by endogenous distributional conflicts over wages and 
working conditions remains a possibility at Dacia. This raises questions about the future of the 
plant and, by implication, for the future of CEE automotive industry as a whole anGWKHUHJLRQ¶V
peripheral status within the EU. 
 
This article is based on 18 months of ethnographic fieldwork on labor relations at the Romanian 
Dacia plant undertaken by one of the authors during the second half of 2012 and the whole of 
2013. Apart from participant observation in the company town of Mioveni and the automobile 
plant, the research included extensive interviews with trade union leaders and blue-collar 
workers. Ethnographic data was supplemented by an assessment of secondary statistical data, 
and a comprehensive review of national and local media (including internal publications) since 
'DFLD¶VSULYDWL]DWLRQLQWKHODWHVDVZHOODVRIRIILFLDOVWUDWHJ\DQGILQDQFLDOdata published 
by Dacia. Following the completion of the ethnographic research, interviews were conducted 
with the trade union leadership during 2015 and 2016 to check the reliability of initial 
interpretations and update the empirical findings. 
 
Productive models and automotive investment in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
During the past decade, studies have gradually moved from analyzing the political economic 
WUDQVIRUPDWLRQRI&(( LQ WHUPVRI WKHVH FRXQWULHV¶ FDSDFLW\ WR HPXODWH:HVWHUQPRGHOVRI
development towards a historically informed understanding of the factors that are specific to 
the region. Consequently, the manner in which capitalism in CEE is depicted has changed: 
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from economic and social systems organized in a sub-optimal fashion, apparently incapable of 
attaining the institutional coherence found in Western European countries, towards fully-
fledged capitalist regimes, espousing their own set of defining features. This has allowed for a 
PRUHVRSKLVWLFDWHGDQDO\WLFDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJHPSKDVL]LQJWKHUHJLRQ¶VPRGHRILQWHJUDWLRQLQWR
international markets and its dependency on foreign direct investment as a source of 
competitiveness leveraging reserves of relatively cheap but skilled labor and an already 
existing industrial base (Nölke and Vliegenthart 2009). 
 
Facilitated by geographical proximity and lower production costs as well as by state policies 
VXSSRUWLQJ WKH GHYHORSPHQW RI QDWLRQDO SURGXFWLRQ FDSDFLWLHV )', LQ WKH UHJLRQ¶V
comparatively outdated automotive industry has been a particularly attractive proposal for 
foreign multinational companies (MNCs). It is by now well ascertained that automotive FDI 
has not been significant enough to raise the region from its peripheral status (Pavlínek et al 
2009, Pavlínek 2015, 2016,  QRU WR VHW LW RQ D FOHDUO\ GLVWLQJXLVKDEOH ³KLJK-URDG´
trajectory of development (Jürgens and Krzywdzinski 2009b). Questions of market 
development and delocalization, labor shortage and wage growth, industrial and social 
upgrading, growing supply chain integration and potential spillover effects nonetheless loom 
large.  
 
These issues have so far been addressed either from the standpoint of the CEE region as a 
whole, with an emphasis on competitive advantages and developments widely shared between 
countries and production sites, or from the standpoint of differences between countries, based 
on the assumption of international capitalist diversity in the region springing from national-
level institutional complementarities. While these perspectives have so far proven productive, 
we believe the debate on the CEE automotive industry needs to shift to a more detailed 
assessment of intra-industry and subnational variations. After all, research on the global 
DXWRPRWLYHLQGXVWU\KDVORQJUHMHFWHGWKHLGHDRIWKHUHEHLQJ³RQHEHVWZD\´WRDFKLHYHVXFFHVV 
(Freyssenet, Mair, Shimizu, Volpato 1998) and beyond the rather abstract issue of low-cost 
production it is difficult to say why things should be different in CEE. Moreover, competition 
over FDI in CEE has been accompanied by increasing fragmentation of national state spaces 
(Drahokoupil 2007), rendering national-level analyses less relevant than they are usually 
assumed to be7KHLPSRUWDQFHRIXQHYHQGHYHORSPHQWIRU&((¶VLQGXVWULDOWUDMHFWRU\LVQRW
limited to the East-West continental divide, but rather extends to the increasingly wide 
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subnational (inter-regional and inter-local) differences in investment and labor market 
dynamics. 
 
To be sure, differences between automotive assemblers investing in CEE have been discussed 
in the literature (e.g., Jacobs 2017), but this has at best been done in a highly descriptive fashion 
and with very limited insight into how strategic differences between companies relate to 
questions of dependency and development. To address this shortcoming, we use Boyer and 
)UH\VVHQHW¶V (2002) framework of DXWRPRWLYH ³SURGXFWLYH PRGHOV´ ZKLFK LV HIIHFWLYHO\ D
comprehensive theory of strategic differences in the global automotive industry. More 
specifically, we argue that the combination of strategically-diverse FDI and deepening intra-
national uneven development managed to generate an assorted array of productive models 
based on firm- and even location-specific governance compromises that have been key in 
HQDEOLQJ DQ DV RI \HW GXUDEOH LPSOHPHQWDWLRQ RI FDUPDNHUV¶ &((-specific profit strategies. 
Addressing the increasing concerns on automotive investment and dependency in the region 
needs to account for this diversity of productive models, together with their specific sources of 
strength and vulnerability. 
 
$FRPSDQ\¶VSURILWVWUDWHJ\FDQWDSLQWRRQHRUDWEHVWWZRRIVL[SRVVLEOHDYDLODEOHVRXUFHV
of profit (Boyer and Freyssenet 2002): economies of scale, supply diversity, product quality, 
pertinent commercial innovation, productive flexibility, and the permanent reduction of costs 
at a constant volume. The viability of profit strategies is dependent on their being adapted to 
the specificities of markets where they try to sell their products and labor markets where they 
set up production operations. These two markets are in their turn shaped by what Boyer and 
)UH\VVHQHW FDOO ³QDWLRQDO JURZWK PRGHV´ ZKLFK DUH GLIIHUHQWLDWHG E\ WKH PDMRU VRXUFH RI
growth (either investment, consumption or export) and form of income distribution 
(competitive, coordinated etc.). In other words, to implement a given profit strategy 
successfully a company first needs to take account of available demand for its products and 
VXSSO\RIODERUZKLFKWUDQVODWHVLQWRDFKLHYLQJUHOHYDQF\³ZLWKLQWKHIUDPHZRUNRIWKHJURZWK
mode that governs the economic and political entity within which the firm is deploying its 
DFWLYLW\´%R\HUDQG)UH\VVHQHW-20). The second condition of profitability consists in 
VHWWLQJXS³DGXUDEOHFRPSDQ\FRPSURPLVH>«@EHWZHHQWKHILUP¶VYDULRXVDFWRUVRZQers, 
executives, employees, labor unions and suppliers) concerning the means that are to be used so 
WKDW WKH FKRVHQ VWUDWHJ\ FDQEH LPSOHPHQWHG LQ D FRKHUHQWPDQQHU´ %R\HU DQG)UH\VVHQHW
2002:19-20). More precisely, the compromise concerns the type of product sold and market 
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segments targeted (the product policy), the actual means of implementing this policy (the 
organization of production), and the role and compensation of labor (the employment 
relationship). 
 
A productive model is the unintended outcome of achieving a stable equilibrium between these 
elements, implying that a constant work of adjustment has to be made in order to fit a profit 
strategy to the available product and labor markets, as well as to the possibilities of shaping 
relations in production. The stabilization of a profit strategy into an established productive 
PRGHO LV QHLWKHU DXWRPDWLF QRU WKH UHVXOW RI D VLQJOH DFWRU¶V SXUSRVLYH GHVLJQ EXW UDWKHU
HPHUJHV³IURPWKHVHSDUWO\XQLQWHQGHGSURFHVVHVZKLFKUHVXOWLQFRKHUHQFHEHWZHHQVWUDWegies, 
organization forms and practices, and the fit between these and the economic and social 
environment. It is a process of achieving internal coherence and external fit which makes 
FRPSDQLHVVXFFHVVIXO´%R\HUDQG)UH\VVHQHW[LY 
 
This dynamic understanding of the links between firm strategies, markets and industrial 
relations allows for a more realistic investigation of change, which emphasizes the endogenous 
nature of the processes that impact firm-level governance compromises and places firm-level 
HPSOR\PHQWUHODWLRQVDW WKHKHDUWRIWKHVXFFHVVRUIDLOXUHRIDILUPV¶SURILWVWUDWHJ\7REH
sure, employment relations can function as a major source of vulnerability as they are not 
always coherently embedded into the overall profit strategy of the firm. The least-cost strategy 
initially adopted by many CEE automotive manufacturers was focused on exploiting the 
availability of cheap labor in a context of relatively weak labor movements and state policies 
that favored the interests of employers. This allowed Western MNCs to use CEE plants as 
testing sites for experimenting with labor management practices that were unfeasible in their 
countries of origin ² e.g., flexibility policies in terms of working time arrangements or the 
widespread use of atypical work contracts (see Drahokoupil, Myant and Domonkos 2014). The 
success of these management policies depended to a large extent on alignments between 
national regulatory regimes, regional labor market dynamics and degrees of strength (or 
weakness) of local trade unions. Increasingly acute labor shortage (Meardi 2007), a reversal of 
long-standing weakness on the side of organized labor (Ost 2009), or heightened costs due to 
relatively high rates of wage growth over longer periods of time can all put established 
productive models in question by destabilizing existing governance compromises. Such issues 
are bound to become more pronounced as the political economic dependency of CEE becomes 
consolidated. 
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³(XURSHDQTXDOLW\ZLWK5RPDQLDQSULFHV´  
 
Located outside the strong CEE automotive cluster (Pavlínek 2015, 2016) the Romanian 
automotive industry started to truly benefit from FDI inflows only in the late 1990s and early 
2000s. Investments have VLQFHUHPDLQHGSULPDULO\GHSHQGHQWRQWKHFRXQWU\¶VFheap labor (Ban 
2013; 2014) and MNCs have kept their ties to global production networks while avoiding high 
levels of embeddedness in the local economy (Egresi 2007). Export-oriented automotive 
suppliers have flocked especially to the Western part of the country, which ensures easier 
access to export destinations, as well as around several traditional industrial centers, where 
skilled labor was more readily available. As for assemblers, Romania has yet to attract any 
greenfield investments. Oltcit and Dacia, the two producers of personal cars set up under state 
socialism, are today both owned by foreign multinationals²Ford and Renault, respectively. 
 
'HVSLWH'DFLDRIILFLDOV¶DFWLYHHIIRUWVDWVHHNLQJIRUHLJQLQvestors starting with the early 1990s, 
political instability and dissatisfaction with foreign coPSDQLHV¶LQWHUHVWLQSXUVXLQJDleast-cost 
strategy entailing a significant downsizing of its highly integrated production activities kept 
the company under state ownership until the end of the first postsocialist decade. Talks with 
producers such as Audi, Peugeot, and even Renault failed in the first half of the 1990s. Even 
though towards the end of this decade both management and plant unions were willing to 
compromise and assemble vehicles from imported parts, the Asian crisis put a swift end to an 
agreement signed with Hyundai in the second half of 1997.1 
 
At the same time, Renault used the Asian crisis as an opportunity to boost its production of 
small passenger cars and expand its operations into developing markets (Freyssenet 2009). 
Alongside the Samsung acquisition in South Korea, the opening of the Curitiba plant in Brazil 
and the founding of Avtoframos in Russia, buying Dacia was an integral part of 5HQDXOW¶VSODQV
to globalize. Privatized to Renault in 1999, it took less than a decade for Dacia to become a 
JHQXLQH³UHYHODWLRQ´)UH\VVHQHWERWKZLWKLQDQGRXWVLGH(XURSH Production boomed 
after the launch of the Logan in 2004 and its quick development into full low-cost range based 
                                                          
1
 The agreement included the annual production of 50 thousand vehicles and 100 thousand engines under a 
Hyundai license. Initial vehicles were to be assembled from imported CKD kits and were not meant to replace 
the production of existing Dacia models. The agreement was explicitly regarded as a major step in securing 
privatization by making the Romanian plant more attractive to foreign buyers. 
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on the same platform. With uncertainty permanently looming at Ford, the other manufacturer 
in Romania, it was the Dacia plant in Mioveni that put Romania on the map of European car 
producers and secured its spot among the rising CEE and European producers (see Figure 1). 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
,QEURDG VWURNHV5HQDXOW¶V LQYHVWPHQW DW'DFLD IROORZHG LQ WKH IRRWVWHSVRIRWKHU:HVWHUQ 
assemblers setting up operations in the region: labor costs were low, even lower than in the 
countries of Central Europe; skilled labor was available, with Dacia peaking at just under 
30,000 employees before privatization; the Romanian market was very far from being saturated 
and good prospects for the national economy would make it grow rapidly in the years to come. 
After having missed out on acquiring âNRGD in favor of Volkswagen, in the late 1990s Renault 
was actively seeking to benefit from the labor and market resources of CEE before they were 
all grabbed by its competitors. Renault planned to take the low-cost approach adopted by other 
assemblers moving into the region to an entirely new level. Driven by a strategy of pushing for 
innovation, Renault planned to use the Dacia brand and its production facilities to put out a 
much cheaper and more cost-effective model than any of its competitors had done in CEE (see 
Figure 2). 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
7KHSURMHFWRI³WKH-GROODUFDU´²RUDVLWZRXOGODWHUEHNQRZQ³WKH-HXURFDU´² 
was aimed at producing an automobile with a similar price to old Dacia models but with vastly 
improved GHVLJQHTXLSPHQWDQGTXDOLW\³(XURSHDQTXDOLW\ZLWK5RPDQLDQSULFHV´ was one 
of the intensely circulated slogans at Dacia in the first half of the 2000s. With such a product, 
Renault intended to conquer emerging postsocialist markets, which were becoming more and 
more heterogeneous as advancing social differentiation transformed consumer needs. Due to 
increasing consumer dissatisfaction with the aging models produced by indigenous companies 
since before 1989, in the 1990s these markets were quickly falling prey to the massive imports 
of used vehicles from Western Europe. With the 6000-dollar car, Renault meant to offer to 
customers from CEE an alternative to both imports and aging indigenous models. This was a 
textbook case of complementary specialization, which fit in quite well with the desires of Dacia 
management and employees. 
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5HQDXOW¶VSODQV FORVHO\ DOLJQHGZLWK'DFLD¶VKRSHVRI VXUYLYDO DQG DPELWLRQVRINHHSLQJ D 
strong foothold on the Romanian market. Though its production had grown significantly in the 
1990s and reached a peak of over 100,000 units in 1997 and 1998, both managers and workers 
at Dacia were well aware that their outdated technological means, comparatively low levels of 
quality, and inability to invest in the development of new models would render them 
increasingly vulnerable to competition and eventually spell their demise. The 6000-dollar car 
project, for which Renault firmly committed in the privatization contract signed with the 
Romanian government, would allow Dacia to retain its dominance on the Romanian market. It 
also meant that production would not be downsized and, despite a thorough restructuring 
program, that a considerable number of jobs would be kept. 
 
The launch of the Logan, the long-awaited truly low-cost vehicle, in 2PDUNHG'DFLD¶V rise 
as one of the largest car producers in CEE. The Logan quickly gained dominance on the 
Romanian market, which was booming in the mid-2000s as a result of rising incomes, a rapidly 
growing national economy, as well as accelerating financialization. Contrary to initial 
expectations, the Logan performed poorly on other CEE markets and registered a striking 
success on Western European markets.2 By the end of the decade, with the Romanian market 
having collapsed after the onset of the 2008/9 crisis, exports accounted for around 90 percent 
of production (see Figure 3). Around the same time, the Mioveni plant reached its full capacity 
of just under 350,000 units per year. Production and exports were boosted by the expansion of 
the Logan program into a fully-fledged low-cost range, once the Sandero hatchback and Duster 
SUV entered production. 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
In parallel with the development of its Romanian operations, Renault turned the Logan into a 
global project. By the end of 2012, it was assembling cars based on the Logan platform not 
only in Romania, but also in Brazil, Russia, Iran, India, Colombia, Brazil, South Africa, and 
0RURFFR$WWKHWLPH'DFLD¶VRSHUDWLQJPDUJLQZDVHVWLPDWHGDWDURXQG-10%, equivalent to 
that of premium assemblers (Automotive News Europe 2012). If in 2009 Dacia accounted for 
                                                          
2
 In 2016, the two main export markets for Dacia were France and Spain, followed by Italy, Germany, Turkey, 
Morocco, Romania, Great Britain, Poland and Algeria (Dacianews.com 2017). 112,000 Dacia cars were sold in 
2016 on the French market alone. In Romania, Dacia maintains a market share of over 30 percent. 
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around 90% of Renault sales growth (Freyssenet 2009:280), in 2012 it proved decisive in 
PDLQWDLQLQJSRVLWLYHILQDQFLDOUHVXOWVIRU5HQDXOW¶VJOREDORSHUDWLRQV 
 
The Logan program was thought out as a radical version of the low-cost strategies pursued by 
Western European automotive producers in investing in CEE. It ended up appearing as radical 
not just because of the degree to which costs and prices were minimized, but also because of 
its success on Western markets, its global spread, its financial yield, and its contribution to the 
growth of its mother company. HoweverWKHVXFFHVVRIWKHSODQW¶VSURILWVWUDWHJ\KDVQRWEHHQ
without consequence for the local level industrial relations, especially in terms of a push for a 
greater flexibility and higher levels of automation. 
 
 
Success, innovation, and the tensions therein 
 
,QWKLVVHFWLRQZHZLOOORRNDW5HQDXOW¶V(XURSHDQVWUDWHJ\IRUWKH/RJDQLQWHUPVRIKRZLWV 
productive model has achieved a certain level of coherence between its product policy on 
European markets, on the one hand, and its productive organization and employment relations 
in Romania, on the other. 
 
If investments by automobile producers in CEE after 1989 generally followed the principles of 
minimizing costs and conquering new markets, they also mirrored the diversity of productive 
models of their main operations in Western Europe. In spite of the apparent similarities, 
9RONVZDJHQ¶V ORZ-FRVW VWUDWHJ\ DW âNRda was markedly different from 5HQDXOW¶V ORZ-cost 
strategy at Dacia. To be sure, Volkswagen also intended to develop a low-cost brand targeted 
primarily at CEE markets dominated by low-income consumers, but 5HQDXOWLGHDRID³-
GROODU FDU´ZDV LPSRVVLEOHE\âNRGD VWDQGDUGV&RQVLVWHQWZLWK LWV ³YROXPHDQGGLYHUVLW\´
profit strategy (Boyer and Freyssenet 2002:66076), Volkswagen used its common platforms in 
GHVLJQLQJâNRGDPRGHOVDQGLQGHHGLQWLPHWKHODWWHUEHFDPH increasingly more difficult to 
distinguish from their Volkswagen equivalents. Conversely, having turned to a productive 
model based on innovation and flexibility in the early 1990s (Freyssenet 1998; 2003), Renault 
opted to design the Logan project from scratch, on an entirely new, low-cost dedicated 
SODWIRUP 7KLV MXVWLILHG GHVFULELQJ WKH /RJDQ DV ³WKH HSLWRPH RI FRQFHSWXDO LQQRYDWLRQ´
)UH\VVHQHW  RU LQ WKH ZRUGV RI 5HQDXOW¶V &(2 DV D ³PDMRU LQQRYDWLRQ´ DQG
³VWUDWHJLF SLOODU IRU WKH HQWHUSULVH DQG WKH >5HQDXOW±Nissan] AllianFH´ -XOOLHQ /XQJ DQG
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Midler 2012:vii). The major difference was that, as opposed to other assemblers moving into 
the region, the Logan was not simply conceived as a cheaper version of an existing Renault 
model, but rather as an entirely new concept that needed to stand on its own. 
 
The idea of producing a vehicle as affordable as possible was anything but new in the 1990s.3 
With German producers dominating the market segment for middle-class cars, in the 1990s all 
other non-premium producers had oriented themselves toward small and affordable vehicles 
(Williams et al. 1994:170-1). For these companies, investing in CEE was meant to lower costs 
even further and the region quickly became specialized in producing large volumes of small 
cars (Pavlínek 2017:10):KDWZDVWUXO\LQQRYDWLYHLQ5HQDXOW¶VFDVHZDV the belief that costs 
and prices could be driven down far below what was at the time FRQVLGHUHGWREHWKHLQGXVWU\¶V
minimum threshold of profitability. Taken seriously, ³(XURSHDQTXDOLW\ZLWK5RPDQLDQSULFHV´
is where the real innovation began. 
 
The initial strategy was for the Logan to provide the means for conquering the growing markets 
of postsocialist countries in CEE. It was assumed that these countries would continue to 
experience economic growth and the distribution of incomes would be shaped in such a way 
as for them to develop strong middle classes, whose consumption preferences and purchasing 
power would make them ideal buyers for such a car. This plan never materialized. With the 
exception of 5RPDQLDWKH/RJDQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFHRQ&((PDUNHWV remained relatively modest 
and the rapid growth of the Romanian market was cut short once the Great Recession set in. 
On Western markets, it is difficult to estimate how much worse the Logan would have fared 
had it not been for the crisis. A direct consequence of the economic and social turmoil that 
came in the aftermath of the events in 2008/9 was the widening of that particular market 
VHJPHQWRI³SHRSOHZKRZDQWWREX\DQHZFDUEXWZKRFDQQRWGRLW²or who cannot no longer 
do it²GXHWRLQVXIILFLHQWLQFRPH´)UH\VVHQHW4 This is a market segment carmakers 
were used to ignoring and for which Dacia filled the supply gap. Government scrappage 
programs and the rapidly gained confidence in the quality offered under the Dacia brand 
                                                          
3
 7REHVXUHWKHHQWLUHKLVWRU\RIDXWRPRELOHSURGXFWLRQLVUHSOHWHZLWKDWWHPSWVDWSURGXFLQJ³SHRSOH¶VFDUV´² IURP)RUG¶V
0RGHO7LQWKH86WR*HUPDQ\¶V9RONVZDJHQ%HHWOHDQGSUDFWLFDOO\DOOPRGHOVSURGXFHGLQVWDWHVRFLDOLVWFRXQWULHVVWDUWLQJ
with the 1960s. For a comparison along these lines between the Logan and the Citroën 2CV, see Loubet (2006). 
4
 As a consequence of growing income inequality, the European car market has in fact become increasingly 
polarized between entry- and premium-segment vehicles. The flourishing of low-cost vehicle sales thus mirrors 
the sustained growth of demand for more expensive cars and SUVs. 
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compounded the effects the crisis had on incomes, credit, and the overall willingness to spend 
money on expensive commodities like automobiles (Wall-Street.ro 2009). 
 
The crisis therefore allowed Renault to cash in a lot more innovation rent on the Logan than it 
had initially expected to do.5 As some authors argued early on (Croué 2006), and despite other 
SURGXFHUVDQQRXQFLQJWKH\ZRXOGIROORZLQ5HQDXOW¶VIRRWVWHSVVRIDULWVHHPVWKDWWKH Logan 
productive model is difficult, if not impossible, to replicate. With no competition in sight when 
it came to price, it was soon enough clear that Dacia held a massive advantage in the growing 
market for low-priced personal cars. Using the Logan platform to develop a 3- and then a 5-
model range provided Dacia with the necessary flexibility to meet fluctuations in demand and 
expand its market foothold. Brisk demand allowed for the rapid expansion of volumes 
considerably beyond the initially planned figures. Furthermore, problems with insufficient 
productive capacities risked depriving Renault of its potential innovation rent. Capacity was 
accordingly increased at the Romanian plant and new investments in Northern Africa were 
undertaken. Apart from innovation rent, Dacia was thus able to extract profit from expanded 
demand and economies of scale (Boyer and Freyssenet 2002:14). Tapping into multiple profit 
sources, it has thus managed to successfully subordinate a volume and diversity strategy to the 
one based on innovation and flexibility.6 This allowed the brand to quickly rise to the status of 
an important player in the European market, with a market share of 2.8% in 2016 (see Figure 
4). 
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
7KLV FRPELQDWLRQ ZDV RQO\ SDUWO\ PDGH SRVVLEOH E\ WKH /RJDQ¶V RYHUO\ IDYRUDEOH PDUNet 
position. The distinctive manner of organizing design and production was another factor that 
contributed to the success of the low-cost project, as all stages, from design to manufacturing 
and sales, were targeted for drastic cost cutting. This involved new approaches to R&D, project 
management, flexibilization and rationalization of production, a markedly tough approach in 
purchasing, and maintaining strict control over costs and quality in manufacturing. Some of 
                                                          
5
 Innovation (or Schumpeterian) rents are earnings resulting from a monopoly held by innovators before 
competitors can imitate an innovation. According to Boyer and Freyssenet (2000), this is a core profit strategy of 
the innovation and flexibility productive model. 
6
 This possibility is discussed in Boyer and Freyssenet (2002:90). Before the launch of the Logan, Freyssenet 
(2003:123-4) considered this combination as one possible pathway for the Renault±Nissan alliance in the new 
millennium. 
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these entailed revamping already existing arrangements found at Dacia along the lines of 
Renault principles and production methods. Others²OLNH WKH ³GHVLJQ WR FRVW´ FRQFHSW WKH
extensive reuse of parts from existing Renault models, or the rationalization of labor-intensive 
production²were genuine organizational innovations specifically tailored for cost 
minimization within the Logan program.7 Importantly, the Logan was from the very beginning 
designed for a labor-intensive manufacturing process, purposely aiming to take advantage of 
'DFLD¶VUHVHrves of cheap and skilled labor. This low-cost-by-design approach thus compounds 
the importance of the labor question. 
 
/DERUUHODWLRQVFRPSULVHWKHILQDOGLPHQVLRQRI'DFLD¶VORZ-cost productive model. The labor 
question at Dacia concerns not just the cosWRIODERUEXWDOVRHPSOR\HHV¶ZLOOLQJQHVVWR follow 
through with and contribute to implementing changes and innovations in productive 
organization. Since privatization, labor relations at Dacia have gone through three phases in 
which different governance FRPSURPLVHV ZHUH VWUXFN EHWZHHQ PDQDJHPHQW¶V JRDO RI 
confining labor within the requirements of the low-FRVWSURJUDPDQGWKHORFDOXQLRQ¶V demands 
for higher wages and improved working conditions. 
 
Despite a substantial restructuring program that from the very beginning included the shedding 
of more than 11,000 jobs (a number that eventually grew to approximately 16,000), there was 
no major conflict between management and union from 2000 to early 2003. Immediately after 
privatization, organized labor proved to be largely cooperative and union leaders voiced their 
ZLOOLQJQHVV WR FRQWULEXWH WR IXOILOOLQJ 5HQDXOW¶V SODQV RI WXUQLQJ WKH company around by 
upgrading technology, reorganizing production, and improving quality. As agreed during the 
negotiations for privatization, in which union leaders took part alongside government and 
company officials, the union would cooperate insofar as Renault kept its end of the bargain and 
minimized the social impact of restructuring. In doing this, union leaders were responding to 
ZRUNHUV¶ FRQFHUQV UHJDUGLQJ WKH VXUYLYDO RI WKH FRPSDQ\ For several years after it bought 
'DFLD 5HQDXOW FRXOG FDSLWDOL]H RQ HPSOR\HHV¶ SUH-privatization IHDUV RI 'DFLD¶V LPPLQHQW
GHPLVHDQGWKH)UHQFKFRPSDQ\¶VLPDJHDVDVDYLRU capable of doing whatever it was necessary 
to keep Dacia afloat and set it on the path to success. 
                                                          
7
 0RVWDXWKRUVGHDOLQJZLWKWKH/RJDQ¶VVXFFHVVIRFXVRQ'DFLD¶VGLVWLQFWLYHSURGXFWLYHRUJDQL]DWLRQ$QJHOHVFX
2007; Croué 2006; Debrosse 2007; Jullien et al. 2012). If they are correct in highlighting the degree of novelty 
LQYROYHG LQ WKH GHVLJQ DQG PDQXIDFWXULQJ RI WKH /RJDQ WKHQ 'DFLD LV D SHUIHFW H[DPSOH RI DXWRPDNHUV¶
experimenting with new ways of organizing production in CEE (see above). Descolonges (2011: ch.3&ch.4) 
paints a more nuanced and critical picture of the rationalization of production at Dacia. 
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A general strike in February 2003 put an end to the post-privatization settlement and set the 
stage for an openly confrontational relationship between management and labor. Alongside 
wage demands, the union criticized the abuses of French managers, the harshness of the 
restructuring program, and the failure to fulfill promises of improving working and social 
FRQGLWLRQV$W WKH WLPH WKHXQLRQ¶V IDLOXUH WR UHVLVW WR VXVWDLned management pressure and 
inability to properly organize workers led to defeat and the reaching of a new governance 
compromise in which labor grudgingly accepted to put off part of its demands in wait for the 
company cutting its losses and improving its financial results. Though the union continued to 
successfully negotiate wage increases over the next years (see Figure 5), these were far from 
satisfactory for both union leaders and regular members. By the time of the 2007 annual 
negotiations, the union was already showing signs of breaking the power play tactics that 
management had adopted since the 2003 strike (see $GăVFăOL܊HLDQG*XJD 
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
A lengthy strike in the spring of 2008 again reset the terms between the two sides. The union 
demanded that employees receive a bigger share of what was by then the obvious market 
VXFFHVVRIWKH/RJDQSURJUDP6WULNHUV¶VRXQGYLFWRU\ZDVDZDWHUVKHGIRUODERUUHODWLRQVDW 
the Mioveni plant and since then the union has managed to obtain substantial wage increases 
every year, as well as significant improvements in working and social conditions. Besides wage 
increases, which until recently remained well above the national average (see Figure 5), 
workers benefit from paid overtime, Christmas and vacation bonuses as well as a performance 
ERQXVZKLFKLVGHSHQGVRQWKHILUPV¶VDOHVSHUIRUPDQFH7KRXJKXQLRQ±management relations 
have remained declaredly confrontational, the tensions of the 2003- 2007 period made room 
for a trade-off between sustained wage increases and substantial and likewise sustained 
productivity increases. 
 
After 2008, the plant quickly reached full capacity and diversified its production. Management 
continued pushing for permanent cost reduction and productivity growth, a result of which 
were the new models launched in 2012²much improved, though at practically unchanged 
prices. If old fashioned labor intensification proved acceptable, the union has been less keen 
on fully giving in to attempts at increasing labor flexibility. As a result, the wages-for-
productivity compromise has started showing signs of weakness, especially since 2012. In 
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response, management developed new strategies in attempting to either break the existing 
compromise or turn it more clearly in its favor by forcing the union to tone down its demands. 
At present, the question remains as to whether this will spark new conflict, reshuffle the 
existing compromise, or bring about entirely new challenges and resolutions. 
 
New threats and responses in search of a new labor settlement 
 
$V ZH KDYH DUJXHG VR IDU WKH VXFFHVV RI WKH 'DFLD¶V SURGXFWLYH PRGHO ZDV EDVHG RQ D 
combination of factors comprising its monopoly over a new market segment, its rigorous 
overall approach to cost cutting, as well as its ability to maintain low labor costs and secure 
compliance from its employees in Romania. Low labor costs and high productivity levels have 
thus been essential in squeezing expected profit margins. With wages in the Romanian plant 
following a sustained upward trend (see Figure 5) and productivity increases being slowed 
down as a result of industrial action by the local union, management has developed a new 
UHSHUWRLUH RI WKUHDWV IRU FRQWDLQLQJ ZRUNHUV¶ GHPDQGV8 Most commonly, these consist of 
explicit threats with relocation to other low-cost sites where the group has set up assembly 
facilities or threats with removing jobs by increasing the level of automation in manufacturing. 
Both sets of threats have contributed to the erosion of the governance compromise established 
after the 2008 strike and challenged the sustainability of the profit strategy implemented at 
Dacia. 
 
Talk of relocation to other low-cost sites became common practice at the Romanian plant 
especially after the 2008 general strike, when the union obtained a significant wage increase 
despite tough opposition from management. These threats were meant to coerce Romanian 
workers into giving up on their wage demands by pointing at the danger of them losing ground 
in favor of assembly plants in Morocco, Turkey, or Russia. Starting with 2012, after the 
opening of Renault±1LVVDQ¶VQHZORZ-cost plant in Tangiers, Morocco has been routinely cited 
as the likely competitor for the Romanian site. Tangiers has been said to have a number of 
comparative advantages pertaining to comparatively lower labor costs, geographical proximity 
to Western markets, as well as transportation infrastructure. Time and again, management has 
                                                          
8
 This is not to say that the union opposed changes meant to improve productivity while maintaining or improving 
working conditions. It has nonetheless forcefully rejected attempts at increasing productivity at the cost of 
rendering labor more precarious. One result of such opposition has been the limited use of atypical work contracts 
at Dacia, especially in comparison to other car plants in the region (see Drahokoupil, Myant and Domonkos 2014). 
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underlined that the Mioveni plant is no longer competitive enough in comparison to its 
counterparts outside Europe, and that relocation to Morocco is a feasible strategy in the medium 
term. In 2012, for example, company officials publicly argued that wages in Romania were 
twice bigger than those in Morocco, which was said to weigh heavily on a possible future 
choice by Renault to downsize or even discontinue its operations in Romania (Ziarul Financiar 
2012). Likewise, in the fall of 2014, the Romanian plant was singled out as no longer being a 
low-cost location for Renault, since it had become the most expensive production location for 
the low-FRVWPRGHOVLQ(XURSH¶VLPPHGLDWHYLFLQLW\ (LesEchos.fr 2014). 
 
Management has also been using indirect relocation threats by emphasizing that future projects 
developed by the group will be assigned to the plant that is more competitive in terms of costs 
(HotNews.ro 2014). One such example was said to be the Dokker project, assigned exclusively 
to the Moroccan site, which nonetheless failed to meet the expected sales volumes. In Romania, 
company officials framed the choosing of Morocco for producing the new model as a definite 
loss for Dacia and argued that future investments in Romania would depend on how it fares in 
competition with places such as Morocco and not with European countries like France or 
Germany (Ziarul Financiar 2011). After the 2008 strike, both local and central media have 
systematically, and more or less unanimously, taken WKHFRPSDQ\¶VVLGHLQDWWDFNLQJERWKXQLRQ
leaders and workers for their irresponsibility in asking for higher wages and refusing to give in 
WRPDQDJHPHQW¶VDWWHPSWVDWDGRSWLQJPRUH flexible working arrangements. Thus, apart from 
PDQDJHPHQW¶VFKDQJLQJWDFWLFVWKHXQLRQ has also had to face an increasingly hostile public 
sphere. Consequently, although in recent years the union has organized several protests against 
the government, these have had no tangible impact. 
 
7KHORFDOXQLRQ¶VUHDFWLRQWRWKHVHUHORFDWLRQWKUHDWVKDVEHHQWZRIROG2QWKHRQHKDQGLW has 
questioned the feasibility of relocation, given the importance of the Dacia factory for the entire 
group. The union has denounced these threats as part of a blackmailing strategy difficult to put 
into practice since the Romanian site is of strategic importance and delivers not just assembled 
vehicles but also complete knocked down (CKD) kits, engines and gearboxes to plants in the 
rest of the group. On the other hand, especially in recent years, the union has often borrowed 
PDQDJHPHQW¶VGLVFRXUVHRIFRPSHWLWLYHQHVVZKLFKLQGLFDWHVWKDW relocation threats have not 
been entirely without consequence. The changing manner in which the union negotiates the 
annual collective labor agreements also indicates that it has toned down its confrontational 
tactics. Since the general strike of 2008, the number of strike threats and protests at the plant 
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has been on the decline, with the union choosing to negotiate with management behind closed 
doors and delivering somewhat poorer than expected wage LQFUHDVHV $GăVFăOL܊HLDQG*XJD
2017). More recently, relocation threats have lost clout, as the Romanian plant has become 
increasingly specialized in producing the Duster, while production for the Logan and the 
Sandero has progressively moved to Morocco. 
 
Instead of relocation, automation is the newest threat used by management in attempting to 
curtail tKH XQLRQ¶V GHPDQGV IRU KLJKHU ZDJHV 5HSODFLQJ KXPDQ ODERU ZLWK URERWLF 
manufacturing systems has been presented as a viable option in mitigating and even reversing 
the trend of rising wage costs. Although after privatization the Dacia factory underwent 
substantial upgrading, its present level of automation is estimated to be at around 10 percent 
-XUQDOXO GH $UJH܈  IDU EHORZ LQGXVWU\ VWDQGDUGV DQG LQ GHILDQFH RI OHDQ SURGXFWLRQ 
orthodoxy (Camuffo and Comacchio 1999; MacDuffie and Pi 1997).9 Despite its labor-
intensive manufacturing processes, the Dacia factory has achieved similar productivity levels 
with more capital-intensive sites in CEE (see Jakubiak et al. 2008, 40). During all this time, the 
union has kept a reserved attitude towards automation and has accepted the push for higher 
productivity levels while negotiating for safe working conditions. 
 
As with relocation, the extent to which these threats can materialize is uncertain. There are at 
least two reasons why the robots-for-humans equation is anything but straightforward at Dacia. 
)LUVW VLQFH 5HQDXOW¶V ORZ-cost range is designed for labor-intensive production, there is a 
question as to the extent to which automation is actually possible without having to bear the 
massive costs of extensive productive reorganization. This would simply translate in the 
plugging of one leak in the low-cost productive model at the cost of springing another that 
would be just as major. Second, it is clear that the Dacia union will not remain passive if faced 
with a concerted strategy aimed at removing jobs by increasing the SODQW¶V GHJUHH RI
automation. Job security is a most prized asset for Dacia union members and the union has 
made no compromises in regard to this after the post-privatization restructuring program ended. 
Dacia workers have proved their readiness to take action if their jobs are threatened. In March 
2013, a two-day spontaneous work stoppage was sparked by ZRUNHUV¶GLVVDWLVIDFWLRQRYHUWKH
delaying of the signing of the collective labor contract, the FRPSDQ\¶VDWWHPSWDWLQWURGXFLQJD
                                                          
9
 Low automation levels are far from uncommon in low-wage regions like Central and Eastern Europe. Just like 
with relocation, the debate around automation in response to wage increases thus relates to the CEE automotive 
industry as a whole and is not specific to Dacia. 
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more flexible work schedule, and an announcement that jobs in the paint shop will be cut in 
favor of automated machinery. Just like with relocation, moving beyond simple threats in 
regard to automation risks provoking a serious conflict, which, as it happened in the past, would 
most likely catalyze the reaching of a new compromise between management and labor. 
 
This apparently zero-sum game between management and union reflects the tensions inherent 
to the low-cost, flexible, and labor-intensive production process that has, alongside a favorable 
market situation, ensured success for the Logan. Behind the glorified façade lie acute conflicts 
between management and labor over remuneration and working conditions²conflicts which, 
when won by labor, can put a severe strain on the profitability of the low-cost productive model 
discussed in the previous section. If we were to listen to voices coming from the side of both 
Renault and Dacia management, in the medium and long term the solution to the profitability 
issue can take two forms. Either the company puts its threats into practice and completely 
relocates to a new periphery, or the plant upgrades its production in order to produce more 
expensive models that provide higher profit margins (Digi24.ro 2014). In both cases, for 
5HQDXOW¶VLQYHVWPHQWLQ5RPDQLDWKLVZRXOGHIIHFWLYHO\PHDQWKHHQGRI low-cost production 
as it has been understood since the birth of the Logan project in the late 1990s²and which, 
after all, was the raiVRQG
HWUHRI5HQDXOW¶VDFTXLVLWLRQRI'DFLD 
 
Conclusion 
 
5HQDXOW¶VUDGLFDODSSURDFKWRORZ-cost production in CEE did not come without its specific 
antinomies. At present, it is difficult to go beyond speculation regarding 'DFLD¶VIXWXUH,WLV 
more or less certain, however, that regardless of the shape taken by the future governance 
compromise between labor and management, it will have to be based on significant changes in 
HLWKHUODERU¶VGHPDQGVRUWKHSURGXFWLYHPRGHOHPSOR\HGVRIDU:LWKRXWDIXQFWLRning social 
settlement at its Romanian plant, neither its favorable market situation nor its innovative 
SURGXFWLYHRUJDQL]DWLRQZLOOEHHQRXJKWRUHSURGXFH'DFLD¶V(XURSHDQVXFFHVV 
 
Immediately after the 2008 strike, some observers (Delteil and Dieuaide 2008) expressed their 
hopes that this conflict was merely a sign of a broader movement that would set the stage for a 
change in the CEE capitalisms, translating into a tendency toward the equalization of wages 
and working conditions across the EU and putting an end to the destructive intra-regional 
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at that time such a hypothesis certainly had the backing of historical precedent. Throughout the 
twentieth century, similar waves of automotive investment in other peripheral regions of the 
globe had contributed substantially to pushing for national settlements favorable to labor 
(Silver 2003). The fragmentation of union movements and the rescaling of the state have 
nonetheless rendered this hypothesis largely invalid in the case of CEE. Instead of a shift 
towards better economic and social rights, in response to the crisis, governments have 
liberalized labor markets, cut back collective bargaining rights and reduced social protection 
expenditures (Guga and Constantin 2017; $GăVFăOL܊HL and Pignatti-Morano 2016; Ban 2016). 
 
In such a context, the consolidation of automotive investments in CEE have at best led to the 
emergence of pockets of localized Fordist-like arrangePHQWVEXLOWDURXQGDVVHPEOHUV¶SXUVXLW 
of a relatively limited focus on collective bargaining rights and secure employment (Jürgens 
and Krzywdzinski 2009a; 2009b). This has definitely been the case at Dacia. Though the low-
cost model has proved relatively VWDEOHVRIDURXUDQDO\VLVRI5HQDXOW¶VLQYHVWPHQWLQ Romania 
points to its inherent tensions as well as to some of its possible future limitations. In responding 
to pressure coming from labor, companies pursuing a low-cost strategy have two options. First, 
they can relocate to other low-cost locations within CEE, as some components manufacturers 
have done already (Pavlínek et al. 2009), or they can even re-establish operations in locations 
in Western Europe where dismantled social settlements have given way to previously 
unforeseen labor deregulation. Second, they can search for other peripheral regions with cheap 
labor and favorable governments in close proximity to EU borders. Renault has already done 
so with its Tangiers plant for low-cost models. 
 
For CEE, these scenarios highlight another possible outcome of European integration and the 
changing division of labor between Western and Eastern countries of the EU: neither remaining 
a single, quiet periphery, nor catching up to its neighboring core, but rather entering into 
competition for grabbing as much as possible of the value chain with peripheral regions just 
outside the EU and even with parts of the core that have fallen victim to peripheralization as a 
result of new policies of spatial selectivity. The case of Dacia, in this sense, might just be an 
example of how both capital and labor attempt to solve an entirely different kind of strategic 
dilemma from those that plagued the CEE (or, for that matter, the European) automotive 
industry in the 1990s, from the overcoming of which they nonetheless originate. As we argue 
throughout this article, on the other hand, the concrete shape and content of these struggles will 
GHSHQGRQFRQFUHWHYDULDWLRQVLQFRPSDQLHV¶product policies, regional labor markets and local 
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compromises with organized labor. 2QFHDJDLQ9RONVZDJHQ¶V³YROXPHDQGGLYHUVLW\´SURILW
strategy has allowed âNRGD to directly compete with the core brand of its owner, which, at least 
theoretically, allows CEE to compete with Western Europe over the development of 
WUDGLWLRQDOO\ ³FRUH´ operations like R&D and strategic management. The situation is quite 
different at Dacia, which is in a league of its own and, at least as long as the current profit 
VWUDWHJ\ VWDQGV SRVHV QR WKUHDW WR 5HQDXOW¶V :HVWHUQ (XURSHDQ RSHUDWLRQV. In addressing 
questions of dependency and industrial upgrading in the CEE automotive industry, research 
thus has to go beyond assessments of regional competitive advantages and national institutional 
complementarities and pay more attention to how they interact with diverse profit strategies 
and subnational patterns of uneven development. We would thus gain an empirically richer and 
theoretically more sophisticated understanding of the mechanisms at hand in deciding the 
present course of CEE in the European capitalist landscape.  
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Figure 1. Passenger car production (units) in selected European countries, 2001±2017. 
Data source: OICA. 
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Figure 2. Average price of EU sales (Euro, including tax), 2005±2016. 
Data source: ICCT (2017). 
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Figure 3. Dacia vehicle production (units) and exports (% of total sales), 2001±2017. 
Data source: Dacia annual reports, Vardie (2009), press reports. 
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Figure 4. Dacia¶VPDUNHWVKDUHLQ(XURSHDQGWRWDO(8-28 registrations (million passenger 
cars) 2001-2016. 
Data sources: ICCT (2017). 
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Figure 5. Annual real average wage growth at Dacia, and in Romania 2001-2017  
Data sources: National Institute of Statistics, press review for nominal gross wages. Real wage growth was obtained by 
deflating nominal wages using the CPI published by the National Institute of Statistics. 2017 Dacia figures are estimated 
using the growth of average personnel costs. 
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